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In spite of having some intensive national strategies to address poverty, Tanzania lacks a coherent 
national strategy to ensure sustainable livelihoods in the informal economy, where more than 75 
per cent of non-agricultural employment in Tanzania is estimated to take place (ILO 2012: 9). An 
approximate 70 per cent of young women and 60 per cent of young men work informally in urban 
areas (UN Habitat 2007: 9). As elsewhere, street vendors in Tanzania are among the most 
vulnerable groups in the informal economy (Brown 2017; Roever and Skinner 2016). This 
vulnerability is seen in the manifold challenges they face. In one aspect of this, street vendors have 
to cope with restrictions in accessing (formal) markets, training, credit, and other economic 
resources. In another, they tend to be excluded from decision-making processes as well as from 
legal and social protection. The result is that their asset base is shaky and prone to seasonal shocks, 
which in turn makes their livelihoods highly unsustainable. 
National and municipal administrations, on the other hand, are under pressure to reconcile 
vendors’ needs with formal regulatory frameworks as well as with taxation and urban planning 
policies. Failure to come up with an institutional framework to improve their livelihoods means 
leaving street vendors behind in the process of development. The current government under 
President John Magufuli has legalized street vending and begun to issue vendor identification cards 
(IDs). This is a major policy turnaround, offering to remove the hardships and lack of freedom of 
street vendors and to unleash their economic potential. 
Against this background, this research paper focuses on the conduciveness of government policies 
to achieving sustainable livelihoods for Tanzanian street vendors, and on efforts to enhance their 
inclusion, organization, and rights. The questions driving the research are: to what extent are 
previous and current policies contributing to improving street vendors’ asset base? What 
opportunities exist for street vendors to organize to defend their rights and to promote their 
welfare at the district, regional, and national levels in an inclusive manner as a step towards 
sustainable livelihoods? 
While the shortcomings of previous policies are well documented by the research literature on 
street vending in Tanzania (see below), we highlight two themes which have so far received 
insufficient attention. Firstly, street vendors are not a monolithic group: there is considerable 
diversity among street vendors in terms of employment relations, gender, age, capital, and assets. 
Secondly, the legal status of street vendors’ work, organization, and the new IDs are crucial for 
sustaining the livelihoods of street vendors in Tanzania. Collected between 2014 and 2019, our 
research data, based on in-depth interviews and participant observation, reflect the impacts of 
changing policies on street vending from the point of view of vendors and their associations. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section surveys the existing literature covering street 
vending as an economic occupation; policies governing street vendors in Tanzania; the existing 
policy gaps; and the importance of unionization for street vendors. In the third section we explain 
our research methodology, including the use of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF). 
Section 4 presents the empirical findings. We address firstly the diversity found within street 
vending and its relevance for vendors’ access to space, capital, and assets, and secondly the changes 
brought about by recent policies and the introduction of the IDs, looking specifically at how this 
has affected vendors’ organization and access to assets. Section 5 presents identifiable gaps in the 
new policy. This is followed by a summary and discussion of the findings in Section 6. Section 7 
provides our conclusion and policy suggestions. 
2 Literature review 
2.1 The nature and role of street vending as an economic occupation 
As an entry-level occupation in the informal economy,1 street vending is one of the major sectors 
to attract those seeking to make an income. Roever and Skinner (2016) found that in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the share of street vendors in total non-agricultural informal employment was between 13 
and 24 per cent in selected cities. Though the actual share and numbers are unknown for Tanzania, 
street vending is estimated to employ between half a million according to official statistics (URT 
2014: xi) and over one million according to recent studies (Lyons and Msoka 2010; Mramba 2015a). 
Accompanying rapid urbanization, Dar es Salaam, the largest city and economic hub of the 
country, has seen a continuously increasing influx of street vendors in recent decades. 
The research literature emphasizes the heterogeneity of the informal economy, as it provides 
opportunities for income generation for people with quite different backgrounds and in diverse 
socioeconomic circumstances. The International Labour Organization (ILO), for instance, 
differentiates between self-employment, paid employment, and unpaid family work in the 
Tanzanian informal economy (ILO 2002: 17). Following in the same vein, the Commission for the 
Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP), in its final report, distinguishes between people in the 
informal economy who live ‘in extreme poverty [and] are typically asset-poor’ and ‘those living in 
moderate poverty [who] have some assets and income’ (UNDP 2008: 19). Informal employment 
further needs to be differentiated in terms of ‘the type/degree of economic risk involved in the job 
and … the type/degree of authority over the establishment or over the workers’ (Chen 2017; 
emphasis in original). 
These careful distinctions between different categories of street traders2 and the adversities facing 
them, however, have been largely overlooked in research on Tanzania: the research literature 
commonly understands street trade as ‘micro-enterprise’ or ‘business’, and considers street 
vendors, including hawkers, to be own-account ‘micro-entrepreneurs’ (e.g. Brown et al. 2010; 
Lyons and Msoka 2007; Lyons et al. 2014; Mramba 2015a; Tripp 1989). 
For many Tanzanians, street vending presents a legitimate, and often the only available, way of 
making a living. Its omnipresence also renders it an indispensable part of life in urban Tanzania. 
Studies have attested to the importance of small-scale trade during the periods of economic crisis 
in the 1980s and economic liberalization in the 1990s (Bagachwa 1982; Havnevik 1986; Kerner 
1988; Tripp 1989, 1997). As a subsistence strategy, street vending continues to be central to 
poverty alleviation today, particularly among the youth. Research further documents the vital 
importance of street vending not only for traders and their families but also to wider communities, 
as well as to the functioning of urban infrastructure and the national economy (see Brown 2015;  
Brown et al. 2015; Liviga and Mekacha 1998; Lyons and Msoka 2007, 2010; Lyons et al. 2012, 
2014; Mbilinyi and Omari 1996; Mramba 2015a, 2015b;  Tripp 1989, 1997).  
Due to the informal and, until recently, non-legal status of street vending, comprehensive and 
detailed demographic and socioeconomic statistics for Tanzanian street vendors are not available. 
 
1 In this paper, we use the term informal economy to describe diverse economic activities, jobs, enterprises, and work 
relations that are not regulated or protected by the state. In Tanzania, these are commonly described with the term 
informal sector (Swahili: sekta isiyo rasmi). 
2 ‘Street trader’ is used interchangeably with ‘street vendor’. 
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Yet, in general, street vending is an occupation of the poor and vulnerable. Regarding the 
Tanzanian informal economy in general, Bonnet et al. (2019) found that there was a close 
relationship between poverty and working informally. Based on measurement by the absolute 
moderate poverty line of US$3.10 per capita per day, 95 per cent of all workers from poor 
households are informally employed while 75 per cent of informal workers are from poor 
households. In a 2007 survey, 27 per cent of street vendors reported average daily profits of above 
TZS11,000, 44 per cent of less than TZS6,000, and 17 per cent of less than TZS3,000 
(approximately US$5, $2.70, and $1.35, respectively). Women were over-represented in the poorest 
group (Lyons and Msoka 2007). Similarly, data on street vendors’ education is sparse; Mushi (2004) 
showed that 80.8 per cent of street vendors had primary education, 8.2 per cent secondary, 0.8 per 
cent a diploma, and 0.3 per cent a college degree, while 9.8 per cent had no schooling. 
2.2 Urban policies governing street vending in Tanzania 
Roever and Skinner (2016: 359) remark that ‘street trade is one of the most visible occupations, 
yet few cities successfully balance the need to support livelihoods with the need to manage public 
space’. Balanced policies and regulation are central to reducing harassment and corruption 
affecting street vendors but also to helping municipal authorities to improve their revenue 
collection (Bhowmik 2005). Services like public parks and community space are normally well 
included in urban master plans, but space allocation for street vendors is still overlooked. 
Mahadevia and Vyas (2017) argue that sustainable solutions to the problem of business space 
facing street vendors lie in planning. In Dar es Salaam, as elsewhere, municipal master plans 
continue to be affected by Western thinking and overlook the necessity of allocating space for 
street markets (Lindell et al. 2016). Municipal governments have repeatedly attempted to relocate 
street traders to newly established, officially designated market spaces. The relocations, however, 
are usually strongly resisted, as the markets tend to be remote from the traffic hubs and provide 
inadequate infrastructure, and allocation of trading space follows no transparent or consistent lines 
(Lyons and Msoka 2010; Nyirenda and Msoka 2019). 
For a long time, street vendors in Tanzania were regarded as covered under the Small and Medium 
Enterprises Development Policy of 2002, but their status has never been fully recognized; instead 
they have almost always been treated as unwanted intruders (Lyons and Msoka 2010; Msoka and 
Ackson 2017), ‘rebels’ (Brown 2017), or ‘refugees’ (Brown et al. 2015) with regard to the existing 
legal environment. It has been noted that the tension between street traders and municipal 
authorities stems from two main realities. Firstly, notwithstanding the long-standing presence of 
street vendors in Tanzanian cities, municipal by-laws often fall short of taking into account the 
need to create space conducive for street trading. Officially designated market space, which 
remains under the auspices of local government authorities, usually accommodates only a small 
percentage of all vendors in a given city (Nyirenda and Msoka 2019). Secondly, street vendors have 
been operating in violation of business registration and licensing laws. Although the Constitution 
guarantees the right to work to every Tanzanian, street trading is covered by neither commercial 
nor labour laws (Ackson 2015). Despite simplification of licensing procedures in recent years, 
becoming properly registered in accordance with existing business, financial, and tax laws on the 
national and municipal levels remains a tiresome and costly process, making compliance almost 
impossible (Lyons et al. 2014; Msoka and Ackson 2017). 
Since the early 2000s, the consecutive governments under presidents Benjamin Mkapa and Jakaya 
Kikwete devised various strategies to cope with the growing numbers of informally operating street 
vendors and to integrate them into the formal economy. The research literature has documented 
the shortcomings of formalization policies, which were implemented inconsistently and to a large 
extent were ill suited to street vendors (Lyons and Msoka 2010; Lyons et al. 2012, 2014). The 
policies were further overshadowed by the continuing criminalization of street vendors. Harsh 
penalty charges, imprisonment, eviction, and destruction of property brought about enormous 
hardships for the traders and their families. For instance, as many as one million traders might 
have lost their livelihoods in the nationwide clearances of 2006 (Lyons and Msoka 2010). 
In late 2016, the government of President Magufuli entered a period of tolerance, following the 
destruction of a street market in the city of Mwanza and protests by traders. The national 
government further explicitly encouraged the practice of street vending to combat unemployment 
and fight poverty, and ordered administrative bodies at the regional and municipal levels to provide 
suitable trading spaces for the vendors. Currently, since December 2018, the government is also 
issuing vendor IDs and has begun collecting revenues from licensed traders. 
2.3 Unionization and street vendor associations  
Just as with other micro-businesses and groups of workers, street vendors’ ability to improve their 
working environment rests on the ability to organize themselves. Muiruri (2010) argues that street 
vendors’ associations are there to enable the vendors to advocate for and defend their rights, pave 
the way to basic services, uplift vendors’ bargaining power, and influence public policy. Most 
vendors’ associations in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, do not deal with licensing, vending sites, 
and policy advocacy but focus on welfare issues (Chen 2001). It is only in South Africa that one 
can witness vendor associations providing some services like bulk purchase, advocacy, training, 
storage, and marketing. Otherwise, vendors’ associations in Africa usually do not have the 
organizational structure and means to effectively engage in advocacy; they also tend to focus on 
single issues. 
Research documents the difficulties for Tanzanian trade unions in organizing workers in other 
segments of the informal economy (e.g. Fischer 2013; Jason 2008; Rizzo 2013), while trade union 
organizing is still nascent in the sector of street vending (Carr 2016). Unionizing is key for the 
institutionalization of gains, as traders in unions and associations can more effectively lobby for 
the improvement of their situation through legal means, as in the prominent example of India (e.g. 
Joshi 2018). In India, legislation governing street trade is significant and clear in its focus: to reduce 
poverty, to regulate street vending, and to empower street vendors to influence its provisions 
(Brown 2017). Tanzania lacks this type of legislation. 
Middleton (2003) argues that trader associations fail to make any significant gains particularly due 
to the changing nature of their context. The associations are also said to be particularly weak in 
advocating for access to public space (Brown 2006). What brings greater worry is that sometimes 
good policies may cease to be enforced or may even be reversed (Skinner 2008). Street vendors in 
Dar es Salaam have tried to organize themselves for a long time but have not been able to 
effectively influence policy-making. The political context they find themselves in is one of 
‘fluctuating political rhetoric’ (Msoka and Ackson 2017: 183) involving periods of tolerance and 
intolerance. 
3 Research design 
3.1 Research methodology 
This is a joint paper presenting combined insights from two independent research projects 
(Nyirenda 2020; Steiler 2020), based on data collected in Dar es Salaam in 2014–16 and 2018–19. 
The first research project and data collection aimed to gather the meaning of vendors’ informal 
status for their livelihoods and labour organization, while the second focused on the changes to 
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vendors’ livelihoods in response to the introduction of vendor IDs. The findings of each project 
are presented consecutively under Sections 4 and 5, and their shared implications discussed under 
Sections 6 and 7. 
Our research uses qualitative research methods—specifically, semi-structured key informant, focus 
group, and expert interviews, a review of policy documents and government strategy papers, and 
participant observation. The informal setting of street vending, and additionally its illegal status 
during the first research period, required methods which correspond with the volatile research 
environment and the uncertainty of vendors’ daily lives, and which are sensitive to concerns and 
issues that tend to be eclipsed by formal and pre-fabricated procedures (Cerwonka 2007; Daigle 
2016). 
Interviews with individual vendors and focus groups reflected the participatory informal economy 
appraisal model (PIEA; see Chen 2017), a method designed for learning about informal workers’ 
perceptions and experiences in their own words. The interviews covered livelihood strategies, 
structural and institutional contexts, government policies, and the challenges vendors face. The 
interviews were structured around thematic areas (for example, vendors’ personal backgrounds, 
access to space, routines and organization of work, vendor IDs) and vendors responded to open 
questions, for example: 
• What challenges do you face at your work? 
• What are your views on the regulation of street vending? 
• How clear to you are the national guidelines on how to handle street vendors at municipal 
level? 
• What are some examples of the challenges you encountered in the issuing of vendor IDs 
at municipal level? 
• What are your hopes for the future? 
The list is not exhaustive; interviews and focus group discussions varied in content, as vendors 
were invited to raise their own issues. Interviews with government officials and experts focused 
on the background, rationale, and goals of policies but also on impediments to their 
implementation. The responses were either tape recorded or noted and then transcribed and 
thematically analysed. 
3.2 Data collection 
The first set of data consists of 29 semi-structured interviews with representatives of government 
institutions, international and local government and civil society organizations, market vendors’ 
associations, and trade unions. In addition, semi-structured interviews, including two focus group 
interviews, were conducted with 33 street vendors from the Kinondoni and Ilala municipalities of 
Dar es Salaam. The respondents were volunteers from various districts, who had built rapport with 
the author during her participant observation. Though the research focused on individual 
experiences rather than quantifiable data, owing to a commitment to serendipity and openness in 
the research process (Steiler 2020), the respondents reflected the diversity among Tanzanian 
vendors in terms of gender, age, personal backgrounds, and livelihood strategies. The 9 female and 
24 male vendors were between 16 and 55 years of age and included vendors working at designated 
and non-designated market areas and roadside kiosks, as well as hawkers working without fixed 
location. 
The second set uses qualitative data collected between 2018 and early 2019 through formal 
interviews with leaders of the newly formed street vendor association for Kariakoo ward in Dar 
es Salaam, as well as a telephone interview with the chairman of the National Umbrella Association 
for Street Vendors (SHIUMA, Shirika la Umoja wa Machinga). An interview was also conducted 
with the Office of the District Commissioner of Ilala municipality. Two sessions of focus group 
discussions were conducted with leaders of the street vendors for Kariakoo ward. The executive 
committee of 15 members was divided into two groups—one composed of eight members and 
one of seven members. As the whole committee had only two women, the researchers purposively 
placed one woman in each group. More data were collected through semi-structured interviews 
involving 36 respondents from Ilala and Ubungo municipalities. The three busiest streets were 
identified and selected from each municipality and then each sixth street vendor was picked until 
a total of twelve vendors was reached in each street. Of these, 11 were female while 25 were male. 
Vendors’ activities were also observed in Ubungo, Shekilango, Sinza, and Kariakoo, where their 
conversations were recorded and analysed. In-depth interviews were further conducted with two 
law experts from the University of Dar es Salaam to establish the legal status of both the 
association and vendor IDs in relation to vendor rights in the light of existing labour laws. Two 
in-depth interviews were conducted with government officials from Ilala municipality. Table 1 
gives an overview of the interviews. 
Table 1: Overview of research respondents 
 Formal interviews with 
government officials, 
experts, and leaders 
Semi-structured interviews with 
street vendors 
 




29 33 24 9 4 + 4 
Round 2 
2018–19 
7 36 25 11 8 + 7 
Total  36 69 49 20 23 
Source: authors’ construction based on own data. 
3.3 Conceptual framework 
The paper draws on the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF; see DFID 1999) to analyse the 
role of regulatory settings and government policies as structures and processes that are important 
in transforming street traders’ livelihoods and making it sustainable through decreasing 
vulnerabilities and thus stabilizing their asset base. We follow the DFID definition that 
understands livelihoods in terms of capabilities, assets (material and social), and activities of people 
in their normal life setting. Livelihoods become sustainable when they can cope with and recover 
from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance people’s capabilities and assets both now and 
in the future. Policies are thus assessed in terms of their potential to reduce vulnerability to shocks 
and stress through strengthening street traders’ asset base. We conceptualize legal insecurity as a 
context of vulnerability for street traders while access to vending space, finance, and skills are some 
examples of assets that will eventually lead to association, representation, and inclusion in decision-
making processes and institutions at various levels of government. We see the legal status of street 
vending and codification of their economic and social rights, including rights at work, right to 





4.1 Policies facing a heterogeneous sector 
Life cycles in street vending 
Street vendors interviewed for this study can be categorized into three groups. The first is 
stationary market traders who own or rent a stall or table at a designated market space. These 
traders pay rent and fees and are relatively safe from eviction; they are, however, unregistered and 
unlicensed and may lose their workspace due to illness, unpaid back rent, or a change of market 
management. The second group is stationary street traders who work in a non-designated area but 
usually return to a fixed location, for instance at the roadside or a street corner. To this group 
belong the Mama and Baba Lishe (street kitchens) and makeshift kiosks, as well as traders with 
larger stocks of merchandise. The third group is mobile hawkers, called machinga in local slang, 
who carry a small selection of easily portable items around with them and display them on demand. 
The differentiation also reflects hierarchical stages of street vendors’ life cycle. The work 
experience and livelihood strategies of many interviewed vendors displayed a similar path: vendors 
taking up street trading because of its level-entry requirements usually start with peddling 
inexpensive wares, often in casual employment or in co-operation with others. With increasing 
experience and capital, vendors move on to own-account hawking of first low-priced and later 
high-priced items. The next step is to make an investment in purchasing equipment, e.g. cookware 
or a pushcart. Once vendors have found a niche for their wares and accumulated sufficient capital, 
they settle into a more permanent vending space, renting or owning a table, kiosk, or storage space. 
Ultimately, a vendor may possess a stall at an authorized market or even their own shop with a 
formal business registration. 
Proceeding along this life cycle, however, takes vendors many years and is riddled with manifold 
risks. The vendors, particularly hawkers, testified to their vulnerability to shocks and stress. Harsh 
competition makes it difficult to find a profitable niche. For some vendors, accumulation of capital 
and business expansion is out of the question, as their incomes barely cover the daily costs of 
living. For others, penalty fares and eviction, conflicts with competing traders, theft and 
confiscation of their property, illness, or accidents may take away in one day what has been 
accomplished over a long time. 
These struggles were exemplified by the life story of one hawker who had been selling wall maps 
and posters in Dar es Salaam for more than 12 years. On six days of the week, he commuted from 
the suburbs to the city centre to buy the posters from a retailer, then spent the afternoon touting 
them to car drivers and bus passengers at a busy road. The number of posters he could purchase 
depended on the sales of the previous day, from which he had to subtract the cost of his meals, 
bus fares, and accommodation rent. After initially doing well, competition had continuously gone 
up while demand for the posters and his profit margin went down. The harsh working conditions 
were taking a toll on his health, and he additionally had to support his ailing parents. He did not 
have the means to switch to another line of business. 
But there are also street vendors who succeed in moving from mere survival to accumulation. 
Accumulation may occur vertically or horizontally. Vertical accumulation implies investing in the 
expansion of their street vending business, e.g. the purchase of a pushcart, a table, or a stall, or 
even the hiring of a worker. Horizontal accumulation allows a vendor to invest in another source 
of income, e.g. a second business or a shamba (small farm), often run by kin. Six of the interviewed 
traders, among them two hawkers, gave an account of how they had been able to reinvest the 
profits of their sales over time and thereby gradually increase their income. Lyons and Msoka 
(2007) similarly document the potential for growth in the sector of street trade. 
Structural factors and individual assets 
The success of street vendors depends on a variety of often overlapping factors: firstly, structural 
factors like gender, age, and social norms play an important role in shaping street vending. 
Research has shown how women, while over-represented in the informal economy, tend to have 
lower positions and lower incomes (ILO 2012; Chen 2017). Our research mirrored the results of 
earlier studies (Lyons and Msoka 2007; Tripp 1997), according to which incomes were higher 
among men and older street traders. Street vending in Tanzanian cities follows an informal yet 
firm gendered division of labour, which is further determined by social norms concerning 
appropriate behaviour for men and women of different ages and marital status (see Steiler 2020). 
For instance, hawking, which implies walking and shouting in busy streets, is the occupation of 
choice for young, penniless, fortune-seeking men but was considered degrading by older, male 
vendors, while female vendors considered it unsafe and inappropriate for women. Female vendors, 
especially when unmarried, further reported facing daily harassment and being disadvantaged in 
the tough competition for customers and trading space. 
Secondly, individual assets such as education and skills matter for both acquiring starting capital 
and developing a fruitful sales strategy. In our study, vendors who had attended secondary school 
or higher fared significantly better than their less-educated peers. One trader who rented a slot at 
an open-air market to sell second-hand clothes explained the links between education, 
employability, and street trade: 
I’ve done [street vending] while I studied at the college. It was very hard, the 
conditions are bad, I had to fight a lot. Now my plan is to get employed. When I 
get employed, I get the capital, then I can continue the business. My target is to 
construct that business, to reach the highest point, then I’ll have my own shop, 
my own company … There is not enough employment … To find yourself a job 
in this country is too hard … But I studied a lot of things … You have to do 
anything, whatever is needed, you cannot choose. Later, I’ll start my own firm. 
(interview, Ilala, Dar es Salaam, March 2015) 
Diversity in capital ownership and employment relations 
While all street vendors interviewed by one of the authors qualified as entrepreneurs in that they 
carried the economic risk of their income generation, only a minority owned a business over which 
they had full authority. Of the 33 traders in this sample, six hawkers sold merchandise for retail 
shops or other street vendors. In at least three instances, the merchandise was owned by formally 
registered retail shops. Unlike entrepreneurs, these hawkers worked for a low wage or on 
commission, not for profit. Many vendors lacked the capital and assets to run their business 
independently: of the 27 traders selling their own products, 11 were pooling their production 
materials or sharing facilities such as equipment or storage rooms with fellow vendors. Three 
reported depending on additional income from occasional informal jobs to acquire the necessary 
capital for their street vending business or to compensate for slack sales, and another three 
depended on the help of unpaid family members. One-third of all interviewed vendors explained 
that their incomes were overall too low and too unstable to allow for accumulation for expansion. 
In addition, the vendors discussed their lack of education and of skills, as well as poor 
infrastructure, as severely limiting the success of their business. A slight majority, among them 
particularly those owning the least assets and capital, stated the lack of employment opportunities 
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rather than business ambitions as their motivation to take up street vending, which they considered 
arduous and insecure work yielding low pay. The choice of casual employment, self-employment, 
and entrepreneurship was thus involuntary rather than voluntary and related to macroeconomic 
conditions, education, and skills (see Bennett and Rablen 2015). These findings are in line with 
other studies on the informal economy demonstrating the neglect of casual wage labour (Rizzo et 
al. 2015) and of structural constraints, as well as the need to differentiate between various 
employment relations and between self-employment for subsistence or for accumulation (Chen 
2017; De Neve 2005; Harriss-White 2010). 
However, this diversity and the varying challenges faced by different subgroups tend to be 
overlooked in key national policies on street vending. The focus on self-employment, 
entrepreneurship, and business skills is central to government policies that are favourable to street 
vending. Entrepreneurship is central to the Business and Property Formalisation Programme 
(Swahili acronym: MKURABITA),3 which aims to ‘economically empower property and business 
owners in the informal sector’ (MKURABITA 2016) and the Tanzanian National Strategy for 
Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA),4 as well as to the Doing Business agenda of the 
World Bank (2017) and its emphasis on improving access to micro-credit and creating a conducive 
business environment for entrepreneurs (see also Lyons and Msoka 2010). 
The perception of street vendors primarily as own-account, self-employed entrepreneurs is also 
underlined in the National Entrepreneurship Strategy devised by the National Economic 
Empowerment Council (NEEC 2017). The NEEC calls attention to the needs of marginalized 
groups such as youth, women, and people with disabilities but designs its training programmes 
specifically for Tanzanians who have ‘the character and attitude of an entrepreneur’ and are ‘able 
to write a bankable business plan and pitch’ (NEEC 2018). Street vendors further qualify as 
owners of their micro-business in the new policy approach of vendor IDs. 
Unequal access to limited trading space 
Differences with regard to vendors’ (starting) capital and available assets also interlink with their 
access to trading space. Officially designated trading space is usually more fitting for well-
established traders. This can be exemplified by the Machinga Complex, a five-storey market 
building constructed in Dar es Salaam from 2008 to 2010. The Machinga Complex was designed 
to host approximately five thousand street vendors and provides 4,206 stalls, 8 storage rooms, 33 
food vending spaces, and 68 kiosks. Similar market structures were planned for Mwanza, Arusha, 
and Mbeya. Most of the stalls, however, remained unoccupied and the Complex has remained 
unpopular among both vendors and customers. In addition to its remoteness, the monthly rent 
for stalls at the Complex is a dividing issue for street traders. Initially set at TZS60,000 (approx. 
US$30) for one stall, the rent was reduced due to low demand to TZS10,000 (approx. US$5) per 
month. For a segment who are already well established in their trade, the Complex presents an 
affordable trading space. These vendors possess skills, experience, and larger stocks, and, in some 
 
3 MKURABITA is based on the policy suggestions of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto’s Institute for Liberty 
and Democracy. The reform plans developed by de Soto and MKURABITA assume that poor Tanzanians possess 
valuable property and assets, which are, however, informal and thus not put to fully productive use. The reform 
process aims to simplify the procedures for registering and formalizing informal capital, assets, and businesses. This 
is envisioned to create an environment conducive to small business and thereby reduce poverty and stimulate national 
economic growth.  
4 MKUKUTA I was implemented from 2005/06 to 2009/10; this was continued by MKUKUTA II, which was 
implemented from 2010/2011 to 2014/2015 (see URT 2005, 2010). 
instances, hold another business elsewhere. This is not the status of many street vendors in 
Tanzania. 
Among the vendors located in the Machinga Complex, female traders and traders with disabilities 
particularly value the safety of the facility, as it offers protection from the harassment and theft 
commonly experienced by vendors who operate on the streets. In the view of these traders, the 
Complex and similar facilities are attractive trading spaces. However, for poorer segments of street 
vendors, particularly for hawkers, even the reduced rent for one stall is unaffordable. Of 33 
interviewed street vendors, 11 had too little in savings to commit to regular rent payments. 
Similarly to other designated market areas (Lyons and Msoka 2010; Lyons et al. 2012), the 
envisioned shopping experience is also unfitting for the typical customers of machingas. Hawkers 
explained that their customers tend to have little cash to spend and prefer buying single, cheap 
items on the spot rather than purposely visiting a market or shop. A facility like the Machinga 
Complex is uninviting for customers who want to quickly leaf through a hawker’s usually small 
inventory to buy a single inexpensive item. 
4.2 Vendor identification policy and its impact 
Description of the new policy position 
Interviews with government officials at Kariakoo reveal that efforts to arrange and tax street 
vendors in Kariakoo started in 2017. The vendors collaborated with their district commissioner 
and planned to design a labelled table for each of the vendors and allocate them in selected streets. 
The plan was to use the national IDs to identify the vendors and then collaborate with the Tanzania 
Revenue Authority (TRA) to collect tax from them. As there was no law that allowed the TRA to 
tax unregistered informal traders, this proved difficult. Uncomfortable with the delay, President 
Magufuli decided to personally design, print, and launch the vendor ID. In December 2018, he 
gave out a total of 670,000 IDs. Each region was allotted 25,000 IDs and the regional 
commissioners were required to oversee the distribution (The Citizen 2018). This new policy 
position opens new opportunities for street vendors’ organization, welfare, and rights. The 
introduction of street vendor IDs attempts to co-ordinate not only vendors’ activities but also their 
contributions through taxes. In summary, features of the emerging national street vendors’ policy 
as pronounced5 by President Magufuli, in several of his public speeches, include the following:  
• Space use must be negotiated, not imposed;  
• Relocation will only occur where adequate space alternatives are assured by the regional 
commissioners;  
• All people have equal right to the city and, therefore, forced relocation is over;  
• Regional commissioners have the sole responsibility to manage street vending in their 
regions;  
 
5 One of the reasons why these pronouncements are not immediately turned into formal written policy is historical. 
The time of Ujamaa (1960s and 1970s) put emphasis on rural development, and street vending in urban areas was 
considered an unwanted occupation of loiterers. The economic liberalization of the 1980s added to the intolerant 
nature of the already revanchist urban policies. 
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• The machinga have the right to work anywhere but not randomly. (President Magufuli’s 
official address, 6 Dec. 2016)6 
The policy7 requires all street vendors (and several other groups of small businesses) who hold 
capital equal to or less than four million Tanzanian shillings (approx. US$2,000) to register and pay 
TZS20,000 (approx. US$10) for the ID per year. The tolerance of street vendors is in line with the 
Tanzania Vision 2025, which was introduced in 1995 as a major policy document to guide 
development into the twenty-first century. The vision mentions five desired attributes for 
Tanzanian society by the year 2020; the first is high-quality livelihoods, expected to be achieved 
through ‘people-centred development, based on sustainable and shared growth and [to] be free 
from abject poverty [where] creation of wealth and its distribution in society must be equitable and 
free from inequalities and all forms of social and political relations which inhibit empowerment 
and effective democratic and popular participation of social groups (men and women, boys and 
girls, the young and old and the able-bodied and disabled persons) in society (URT 1995: section 
1.2.1). 
Street vendor identification and tolerance in the cities are steps that are welcomed by street 
vendors, who feel that former government regimes did not care for their wellbeing. That is why 
for a long time they were hostile and took the government to be an enemy. 
We considered ourselves orphans and we did not want a journalist or anybody. 
The current president is the first to be supported by the machinga. Even when he 
leaves power, he will remain our president. (focus group discussion, 
November 2019, Upanga, Dar es Salaam) 
Association, innovation, self-administration, and access to finance  
Periods of tolerance by government authorities allow street vendor associations to emerge on the 
national, regional, and district levels and open opportunities to restore and strengthen vendors’ 
right to the city. First, in Kariakoo, efforts to associate started back in 1998 but associations could 
not become formally recognized, as the general policy environment was hostile to street vending. 
A short historical account by one of the leaders of the Dar es Salaam Kariakoo Wamachinga 
Association (KAWASSO) recalls that in 2013 the Kariakoo wing started to be vigilant following 
cases of torture by the police, but their efforts could not go further than peer pity and 
encouragement. 
Second, at national level, the umbrella association SHIUMA has developed a website containing 
information about their organization and its events and activities. In Kariakoo, KAWASSO has 
developed a web-based interactive portal containing data on street vendors from all regions of 
Tanzania. Members join at will. This has helped a lot in controlling theft and other forms of 
misbehaviour in Kariakoo. Through it one can get access to data concerning any street vendors in 
Tanzania just by scanning the vendor ID. The interactive and comprehensive app can be used on 
a mobile phone and gives many details on the vendors, including name, age, photo, place of birth, 
national ID number, taxpayer’s identification number (TIN), house number, ten-house leader, 
table number, telephone number, zone, street, bank details, etc. It also links small traders to 
 
6 The information shared here is summarized from President Magufuli’s address to officials from the Ministry of 
Regional Administration and Local Government on the stated date, at the state house in Dar es Salaam. Official 
written guidelines on street vending are still not available. 
7 Announced presidential decisions are not considered decrees or directives in contemporary Tanzania. According to 
municipal authorities, once the president gives an order it becomes, in effect, national policy. 
financial sources like banks. KAWASSO also collaborated with the National Identification 
Authority (NIDA), TRA, and immigration offices to register the vendors in Ilala municipality, and 
more than 4,800 vendors were registered for their national IDs in July 2017. The street vendors of 
Kariakoo, in talking of their potential, refer to themselves as ‘gold that was lost in the mud’.  
It was found during the study that Ilala municipality had developed a culture of collaboration, 
where the district commissioner sat down with the street vendors to plan. In Kariakoo they 
planned together for the vendors’ tables. Formerly, most of the vendors in Kariakoo had placed 
their merchandise on the floor because it was easier to collect it and run in case of a police raid. A 
few had tables (or stretchers, as they call them) that measured 4 × 6 ft. KAWASSO and the district 
commissioner restructured the tables to 4 × 4 ft in order to optimize space use. By the time of the 
study, the contracted supplier had supplied 1,148 tables. The beneficiary pays TZS75,000 (approx. 
US$38) in four instalments. The leaders of KAWASSO have also put representatives in each short 
street for administrative purposes. 
SHIUMA8 is an umbrella organization, and its constitution encourages vendors to form district 
and regional associations under it. It is well recognized at national level. The leaders have common 
social media interactive groups with ministers, political party leaders, district commissioners, and 
other political leaders where they discuss issues concerning their work and policy. Members of 
these associations contribute funds for the running of their offices. The major two aims at the 
national level are to unite all machingas in the country and to advocate for national policy which 
will lead to national law. By the time of the study, only one case of direct advocacy had been 
reported from Mwanza where, in 2018, a businessman was trying to defraud a machinga lady of 
her land. SHIUMA helped her to get a lawyer and she won the case. 
The recognition of street vending has positive effects not only on the emergence of associations 
but also for the organization of street vendors in trade unions. While the sector is generally difficult 
to organize due to the high mobility of street vendors, earlier efforts of the Tanzania Union for 
Industrial and Commercial Workers (TUICO) to recruit traders had additionally been thwarted by 
‘legal hostility’ (Ackson 2015) and evictions. According to TUICO representatives, the changing 
position of the government has allowed the trade union to develop new strategies to engage with 
street vendors. For the time being, TUICO was focused primarily on organizing market vendors, 
whose workplaces are more permanent than those of machingas. 
One of several important outcomes of the introduction of the vendor IDs in Tanzania is an 
increase in trust. This has in turn attracted the possibility of vendors being considered by financial 
institutions as potential and trustworthy borrowers. The biggest bank in Tanzania (the CRBD) 
stepped in soon after the introduction of the IDs and set up a special scheme for street vendors. 
The scheme accommodates both group and individual small loans of up to TZS500,000 with the 
ID as collateral. The scheme includes training in business management and insurance. 
 
8 Although VIBINDO (Jumuia ya Vikundi vya Wenye Viwanda na Biashara Ndogondogo, Community of Groups of 
Small Producers and Small Business) is mentioned many times in the literature as the representatives of all small 
business groups in Tanzania, SHIUMA insists that VIBINDO has never represented them. As SHIUMA understands, 
VIBINDO was trying to organize market vendors and not street vendors. According to SHIUMA, market vendors 
respond to market regulations and are easy to monitor and administer. This is also the case for those small traders 
who work within bus stops. Therefore, the main task of SHIUMA is to co-ordinate the vendors who operate along 
streets. Yet to demarcate clearly between vendors inside and outside markets is not easy. There is a lot of overlap—
especially now that the IDs are issued to all traders with capital below four million Tanzanian shillings. The street 
vendors identify with their association in terms of what they call ‘collective pain’—that their leaders are also proper 
machingas. This is where VIBINDO ceases to fit in. 
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The changing definition of ’street vendor’ in Tanzania  
According to Bromley (2000: 1), ‘street vending is simply the retail or wholesale trading of goods 
and services in streets and other related public axes such as alleyways, avenues and boulevards’. 
One theory holds that, historically, the word ‘machinga’ connoted a ‘marching guy’, a hawker, and 
not all small traders. However, in Tanzania the definition of a street vendor is currently very 
blurred. When President Magufuli introduced the vendor IDs he stated openly and clearly that 
they were meant for street vendors who suffered from constant harassment by the police. In his 
speech he remarked that the aim was to make sure they were no longer disturbed and were free to 
do their business anywhere provided that they followed the guidance of municipal authorities. 
However, the identity of the targeted vendors was immediately expanded. Roadside kiosk owners 
started immediately to identify themselves as machingas. As there were no national guidelines 
clarifying the targeted beneficiaries and because the performance indicator was the number of IDs 
sold, officials at municipal level began to sell IDs even to people not falling under the category of 
small informal traders. In one of the regions, a regional commissioner produced an awkwardly 
long list of 47 categories, including bartenders, small miners, taxi drivers, commuter bus 
conductors and drivers, freelance journalists, small industrial workers, and even the beneficiaries 
of the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF), which is meant to support poor families. 
Slowly, the term ‘machinga’ has evolved to include various kinds of small businesses, especially 
those conducted along the streets. Yet in normal use, a watch maker and shoe shiner would hardly 
be included in the list of machingas. The introduction of the vendor ID in Tanzania has basically 
re-defined ‘machinga’ to include all businesses running on capital below four million shillings. As 
we have shown, this is hard to determine. Today, even SHIUMA does not restrict the definition 
of street vendor to the original sense of a seller who walks around. The sense of permanence 
encroaches, as implied in this statement from one of the leaders: 
We cover all the small traders, but we wish that we were all permanent—not 
hawking. The hawkers are hard to trace. They are also hard to develop. If you want 
to help them, it becomes hard. It is also very important for security purposes. We 
need to know where each one of us is and what their number is. (interview, 
Upanga, Dar es Salaam, November 2019) 
5 Some identifiable gaps in policy 
5.1 The need for legal backing 
The chairperson of the Tanzania Law Society (TLS) is quoted as stating: ‘We need a law which 
will describe a small trader. This will help to create uniformity of practice all over the country’ 
(Mwananchi9 2018). A national law covering street vendors, however, is missing in the new policy 
advancements. Currently, the rights of vendors are not openly and clearly stipulated in any formal 
government policy document. Neither is there any law to back up their associations and their 
activities. The leaders of KAWASSO hope for the complete legalization of their activities and 
organization. As their chairperson remarked: 
 
9 Mwananchi is a widely read daily newspaper in Tanzania. 
It is good that the president is speaking for us. Now we are requesting him to put 
things in writing at least for reference. (focus group discussion, Upanga, Dar es 
Salaam, October 2019) 
During the field work, SHIUMA and KAWASSO were registered under different laws. At national 
level SHIUMA is registered under the ministry responsible for community development, but at 
lower levels district and regional associations are registered, like other non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The leaders of SHIUMA intend to 
transfer its registration to the Ministry of Home Affairs—to give it the status of an NGO that can 
engage in advocacy. Though street vendors have started to conduct meetings and have established 
offices and formal leadership for their newly formed associations at the national, regional, and 
district levels, legislation is still unclear on their legal status and guaranteed rights. 
The argument of the vendors is: if the ID is issued by the president, whom do the machingas 
report to? Which ministry are they under? They do not have industries, so they do not belong to 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The Ministry for Regional Administration and Local 
Government has been given the mandate, but the vendors feel that the minister does not seem to 
deal directly with them. 
5.2 Policy co-ordination at national and municipal levels 
Ilala municipality has been outstanding in its performance for several reasons. One is that it hosts 
the core of street vending in the country—including the Kariakoo Market area and the Machinga 
Complex. The second is that KAWASSO is led by the national deputy chairman of SHIUMA. But 
thirdly, the municipal authorities seem to have been relatively more co-operative with the street 
vendors. This fact came out clearly in the focus group discussion we conducted with the leaders 
of SHIUMA representing Ilala municipality. 
For some other municipalities the policy link is not as strong. One of the remarks from the 
respondents is that some municipal authorities have regarded the ID policy as the ‘president’s 
issue’. 
We only trust the president. These others are not yet understanding us! They still 
have the old mentality that we do not matter. (focus group discussion, Upanga, 
Dar es Salaam, November 2019) 
The media has reported serious mismatches in policy implementation between various regions of 
the country. This has necessitated that the president intervene from time to time to clarify issues. 
In some regions of the country, the IDs were sold at a price higher than the designated TZS20,000. 
Also, most of the IDs were sold in Dar es Salaam, although each region was allotted an equal 
number of 25,000 IDs. Each region was therefore required to be innovative, and this opened a 
loophole for perverse opportunism. There were big-businesspeople who bought the IDs, brought 
them to Dar es Salaam, and then distributed them to small traders who helped them sell their 
goods in order to avoid taxes. There is also no serious inspection of vendor IDs. The vendors ask: 
what is the difference between a vendor who has an ID and a vendor without ID? If the ID does 
not matter, are people going to buy the ID next year? 
Despite the tolerance of street trade in urban areas under the current administration and the 
introduction of easily obtainable vendor IDs in 2018, competition over scarce urban trade space 
remains. Some vendors fear that these are moves to segregate them and push those with very 
limited capital out of Dar es Salaam. As described, vendors differ substantially in their daily income, 
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and prime business areas like Kariakoo are affordable only to a minority. Vendors who cannot 
compete successfully feel that the IDs are meant to push them out of the city. 
5.3 Vendor IDs and revenue collection  
If all the IDs are sold (which is what is expected) the government will collect TZS13.4 billion. This 
is good news for the TRA, which was also praised for having surpassed its tax collection targets 
towards the end of 2019. However, as mentioned, larger businesses are using the IDs and street 
vendors to avoid tax. For some vendors, on the other hand, the ID is an opportunity for relief on 
the levies that they pay. Formerly, they paid about TZS500 per day to the municipal authorities. 
This means more than TZS160,000 per year—against the new amount of TZS20,000 per year. 
Moreover, under President Magufuli, most public funds are centralized. Municipals have limited 
autonomy in income generation and expenditure. This study found that municipal authorities 
considered the vendor IDs another instrument used by central government to cut deeper into what 
used to be collected at municipal level. Some municipal authorities are trying to be innovative, and 
manipulative, in order to absorb the apparent loss. In one case, beneficiaries of TASAF, which is 
meant to support poor families, were required to pay for the ID in order to continue receiving the 
benefit. Normally, municipal authorities collect market levies. After the introduction of the IDs, 
some traders with IDs can be found both inside and outside of markets. In Arusha, tensions have 
arisen between TRA officials and the municipal authorities on how to collect levies from vendors 
holding the ID and trading inside and outside the main market. 
6 Summary and discussion of the findings 
Street vending provides a crucial and, in light of lacking alternative employment opportunities, in 
many cases the only way of making a living for hundreds of thousands of Tanzanians. It is 
commendable that criminalization and evictions of street vendors have halted under President 
Magufuli’s government. The legislative and policy environment, however, still needs to be 
improved for street vendors to continually enjoy sustainable livelihoods which can withstand 
stresses and shocks. 
The confusion surrounding the ambiguous and often fluid employment relations of street vendors, 
however, presents an ongoing challenge for TUICO: On the one hand, informally employed 
vendors are often not aware of their status and rights as workers, and the employers, usually owners 
of larger businesses, tend to hide the employment relationship. On the other hand, the trade union 
has yet to develop strategies and expertise to defend the business rights and interests of actually 
self-employed vendors. 
One pitfall of previous and current policies is that they have paid insufficient attention to the 
socioeconomic diversity in street vending. The depiction of street vendors as own-account, self-
employed business owners fits only a minority of interviewed vendors. In some cases, this 
categorization is indeed a mere euphemism, as it optimistically presents street vending as a pathway 
to individual accumulation and economic growth and obscures the obstacles many street vendors 
face in their struggle for survival. Structural factors like gender and age, as well as individual assets 
and capabilities such as education, skills, and access to capital, are central to the success of street 
vendors in proceeding from subsistence to secure and sustainable livelihoods. 
As the name implies, street vending takes place in the streets. Relocating street trade and hawking 
away from the streets to costly and remote facilities is not only a contradiction in terms: it also 
offsets the benefits that the widespread and long-standing culture of street vending provides for 
both vendors and their customers, particularly those with low incomes. It is important that vending 
space is accessible, affordable, and safe for diverse groups of vendors who have different needs. 
Against this background, the new policy under President Magufuli of tolerating street vending in 
attractive locations in different parts of the cities, close to the daily flows of customers, is a 
welcome change and has raised the hopes of street traders across Tanzania. At the same time, 
public space is becoming congested, partly because the new policy environment is misused by 
businesses which do not qualify as street vendors with low capital. The harsh competition 
disadvantages street vendors with fewer assets and capabilities. 
The power of the policy shift can be seen from its immediate outcomes. The new policy position 
has improved street vendors’ livelihoods in three ways at least. It has unleashed self-management 
potential and set the stage for vendor association, unionization, and representation in decision-
making bodies at multiple levels of government, which is a form of social capital. It has also 
removed the long-standing conflict between municipal authorities and street vendors, which is a 
good example of reduction in vulnerability. Finally, it has significantly increased access to financial 
assets, since the ID is also recognized as collateral for small loans. Although the ID is also a way 
of introducing the vendors to the ‘tax radar’, they generally consider the policy to be a better 
option than the alternative context of continued vulnerability. 
The question of whether the IDs mean that street vendors are now allowed freely and permanently 
in the city is also posed. During the field work in 2018–19, it could be clearly seen that the streets 
were becoming more and more squeezed as the number of vendors increased. In addition to 
hawkers and owners of small kiosks, some traders downscale their businesses in order to take 
advantage of the policy opportunity. They close big shops and open wooden and metal stalls along 
the streets. Increasingly, stalls look more and more permanent. Yet what the government authority 
pronounces does not promise any permanence. Recently, when the minister for regional 
administration and local government was opening the national meeting of SHIUMA, the 
dominating discourse was that the government was setting aside TZS149 billion for the 
construction of markets, modern bus stops, and small industries. This sounds alarms that despite 
the new policies, the government is expecting street vendors to move into industries and markets, 
not along the streets. 
There is a gap between what the higher authorities are directing and what the executive bodies at 
the regional and municipal levels understand and do. One of the outcomes of this weak link is that 
practice is not uniform all over the country. How street vendors are treated in one municipality is 
not the same as the way they are treated in another. There are misinterpretations and malpractices 
surrounding the distribution of vendor IDs. The distribution of IDs across regions irrespective of 
actual demand neglects the concentration of vendors in major cities and has led to misallocation 
of the IDs. Follow-up on the possession of the ID among traders is also missing. This may be the 
case for at least two reasons. One is that the follow-up exercise has budgetary implications, while 
the second is that the funds collected are going to belong not to the municipality but to the central 
government, and so municipal authorities do not see the need to commit to the exercise. 
Another issue is how street vendors are defined and how the vendor IDs are distributed. We have 
seen that the definitions of machinga, street vendor, and small business are changing. The 
argument for a definition  based on holding capital of less than four million shillings does not hold 
in all cases: some vendors hold capital of above that sum, but this is hard to verify. The questions 
of how the maximum required capital is determined and how merchandise agency is controlled so 
that big traders do not misuse the policy have not yet been clearly addressed. Some occupations 
categorized as machingas are not ‘capital’ owners. They sell labour. These include small-scale 
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miners, salons, and informal brokers. The annual fee of TZS20,000 may also be too small for some 
vendors, while for others it requires the whole capital they have. 
In the past, law enforcement and policies towards vendors exposed vendors to shocks which too 
often resulted in the loss of capital and livelihoods. The issuing of IDs, as well as the use of public 
space by vendors, cannot be sustainable if it depends on the political will of the president. The 
specificities of street vending and vendors’ rights remain insufficiently recognized in national 
business licensing and registration and in labour laws. However, we consider it a positive 
development that street vendor associations are increasingly included in the design and 
implementation of regulations and by-laws at the municipal level. 
7 Conclusion and policy suggestions 
Based on our findings, we suggest that policies and regulation concerning street vending need to 
be sensitive to the heterogeneity among street vendors and the specific needs of different groups. 
Policy design should strive to be inclusive of vendors at all stages along the street vending life 
cycle, and to account for various employment relations and differences in terms of capital, assets, 
education, and skills. In addition, specific groups, such as women, youth, or people with disabilities, 
may require varying forms of support and protection. 
We propose the introduction of subcategories to the IDs which balance costs and benefits for 
vendors who purchase them. For instance, the common annual fee of TZS20,000 per ID could be 
varied to account for the enormous differences in vendors’ capital and income. Vendors at such 
places as Kariakoo could continue with daily levies of about TZS1,000 or a higher annual fee, while 
the fee for the ID would be reduced for vendors in other areas. The fee could also be reduced for 
specific groups—for example, disabled vendors. Considering the enormous numbers of street 
vendors, the high demand for IDs, and the scarce trading space, in the medium to long run, 
competition among traders and the congestion of vending areas can only be reduced by the 
creation of decent employment. 
Tanzania needs clear policy guidelines for regions and municipalities in order to bring about 
uniformity in practice. We suggest placing responsibility for issuing IDs at the ward executive 
officer’s desk as a continuous process. This will take care of the problem of management of the 
funds, as well as that of ID renewal. As we have seen, IDs get lost. If the ward executives are made 
permanent custodians of the IDs, vendors will have flexibility and ease of access. They can pay for 
new IDs and renew their old ones at times convenient to them. 
The innovations of the Kariakoo machingas should be taken as the model. The portal and database 
they have prepared could be adopted for use nationwide. The co-operation between municipal 
leaders and street vendors in Ilala is an example that can inform practice all over the country. 
Regional commissioners must find time to conduct regular meetings with street vendors—at least 
monthly. Vendors have also indicated that they now need a representative in parliament, just like 
other strategic groups. 
The ID itself needs a lot of improvement. Street vendors, through their association, have tabled 
this issue with high-level government authorities. The IDs need to carry the owner’s photo and 
name. Other features could include the owner’s telephone number and, at a later stage, even 
biometric features. This will help to reduce the possibility of people using IDs that do not belong 
to them. 
Finally, the status of street vending and of vendors, their obligations, and their economic and social 
rights need to be clearly defined in law to give permanence to the current favourable policies. 
Labour, business licensing, and registration, as well as tax laws, need to be amended to account for 
the specificities of street vending. In particular, the rights of vendors to work and to association 
need to be guaranteed in order for vendors’ voice to be heard in decision-making processes. This 
will enable them to move from a state of policy begging to policy advocacy and bargaining. 
It can rightly be concluded that, though some shortcomings remain, the new policy position has 
reduced the hardships and vulnerabilities of the majority of vendors, and has increased their access 
to credit, to market space, and—importantly—to decision-making institutions, thus contributing 
to sustainable livelihoods for vendors. Once the impeding restrictions were removed and vendors 
allowed to trade freely, they unleashed their once forcefully suppressed potential in organization, 
administration, and the use of information technology. 
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